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RECENT DECISIONS
other branch of the law of illegal contracts, namely, ultra vires con-
tracts of corporations. Where a corporation has made a malum
prohibitum contract which is subsequently partially executed, both the
New York and federal jurisdictions have permitted recovery after
the repeal of the statute making the contract illegal; the proper rem-
edy in the former courts being an action on the contract, while in the
latter it is in quasi-contractD In New York there is a distinction
between a inalum prohibitum contract and one which is nalum in se,
recovery only being permitted in the former case after the repeal of
the violated statute. In the case under consideration, the Prohibition
Amendment was repealed which prohibited such acts as the sale and
transportation of liquor, which activities are not inherently immoral
and are not mala in se.10 For this reason recovery though denied in
the federal courts would have been permitted in New York State.
The case of Bloch v. Frankfort Distillery is directly in point." There
plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of contract for the sale
of 470 cases of whiskey made when the Eighteenth Amendment was
still in force. On motion for summary judgment, the defense of il-
legality based on the Prohibition Amendment was held invalid in view
of the repeal of this Amendment. This interpretation is a satisfac-
tory one, for when a prohibitory statute is repealed, it is usually due
to one of two reasons, either its accomplishments have been unsatis-
factory or there is no longer any need for it. "Since the interests of
the state no longer require the enforcement of the repealed statute,
it is wise to hold the parties to the bargain which they made.
M. M. S.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-WITNESSES-GRAND Jut.-Appellant
was served by the district attorney with a subpoena duces tecum to
appear forthwith before the New York County Grand jury in a
John Doe proceeding, and to produce a considerable list of enumer-
ated account books, ledgers, etc., bearing on the business of the
appellant. The appellant, unfamiliar with the nature of the matter
under investigation, appeared forthwith at the office of the district
not be taken away by a similar statute, and that a repeal of a law which gave
such right of action or defense, terminated all claim to such defense, although
the contract was made previously.
"This rule is applicable to the present case. The defense to the contract
was given by the statute against stockjobbing. That statute was repealed after
the contract was made. The repeal of the statute has taken away the defense
of illegality, the same as if such statute had never existed."
9 PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1937) 401.
20 Matter of Birner v. Santa Lucia Wineries, Inc., 155 Misc. 722, 282 N. Y.
Supp. 257 (1935).11 Bloch v. Frankfort Distillery, 247 App. Div. 864, 288 N. Y. Supp. 749
(1st Dept. 1936).
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attorney and was questioned by an assistant who explained the na-
ture of the evidence sought. He was then given a personal subpoena
requiring him to appear again at a later definite date but not requir-
ing him to bring any books or records. Appellant answered this sub-
poena, gave information concerning his business, and explained his
method of keeping his records on yellow sheets of paper. He was
then directed verbally by the foreman of the Grand Jury to appear
on the following Monday and bring whatever notes, records or yellow
sheets "you have". Appellant stated to the district attorney that he
understood what was meant by the yellow sheets and would bring
them on the following Monday. No further subpoena was served.
On Monday, appellant brought a yellow paper but had torn from it
the names of the people with whom he did business. Upon stating
that he had a duplicate at home, he was ordered verbally by the fore-
man to produce it the following day. The following day appellant
appeared and stated that he had sent the sheet out of the jurisdiction
to a friend in another state. The foreman of the Grand Jury directed.
the district attorney to bring proceedings to punish the appellant for
contempt. Appellant was adjudged guilty of constructive criminal
contempt and denied permission to purge himself. The determination
was affirmed by the Appellate Division. On appeal, held, reversed.
Appellant did not disobey a lawful mandate of the court. Spector v.
Allen, Judge, 281 N. Y. 251, 22 N. E. (2d) 360 (1939).
Contempt of court is civil or criminal, depending upon whether
it is incidental to a civil action and prejudices, impedes, or obstructs
the rights and remedies of the parties, or is an affront to the dignity
of the court or a defiance of its authority.i It is direct or constructive,
depending upon whether or not it is committed in the presence and
view of the court. If criminal contempt is direct, it is punishable
summarily by the court; if constructive, then by a special proceeding
and the party charged must be notified of the accusation and given a
reasonable time to make his defense.2  He is not, except where the
right is granted by statute, entitled to a trial by jury.3  Generally
speaking, a civil contempt is not considered an offense against the
dignity of the court. It is more of an offense against a party in whose
favor an order or decree has been made and who is entitled to have
the order or decree performed.4 But the distinction between civil and
criminal contempts is not always clear and definite, for in criminal
contempt there is frequently involved a question of a private right,
1 People ex rel. Munsell v. The Court, 101 N. Y. 245, 4 N. E. 259 (1886).
2 N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751.
3 See 35 C. J. (1935) p. 194, § 99. In New York a jury trial is allowed in
contempt proceedings arising out of labor disputes-N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 753-a. A bill is now pending in the New York Legislature that would allow
trial by jury as a matter of right when the contempt is not committed in the
view and presence of the court: SENATE INT. No. 918, PRINT No. 1044-1940.
The right to a trial by jury in contempt proceedings did not exist at common
law. It is a right that has been created by statute in some jurisdictions.
4 Witmer v. District Ct., 15 Iowa 244, 136 N. W. 1.13 (1912).
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while in civil contempt there is frequently encountered the element of
punishment as distinguished from the mere enforcement of a remedy.5
So if the failure of a witness to appear, although calculated to preju-
dice the rights and remedies of the parties, does not do so, then the
court may not impose a fine to compensate a party to the action for
damages on account of the witness not appearing. But under such
circumstances the court can and should adjudge the witness guilty
of contempt and fine him the cost of the proceeding plus an additional
fine as a punishment.6
In New York, as in many other jurisdictions, statutes prescribe
and limit the powers of courts to punish for criminal contempts.7 The
appellant herein was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt by the
court by reason of his "wilful disobedience to its lawful mandate".
There is no question that the appellant wilfully and deliberately re-
fused to produce the yellow sheet and placed it beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court after being requested by both the foreman of the
Grand Jury and the district attorney to bring it in for examination.
Despite his deliberate act to embarrass and obstruct the administra-
tion of justice, he was allowed to escape punishment on what might
appear to be a technicality. But the oral direction of the district at-
torney was not a lawful mandate of the court although the district
attorney as an officer of the court has power to issue a valid subpoena.8
A strict compliance with the statute is essential to protect liberty and
to avoid abuses.9
A subpoena duces tecum must be clear and specific and must de-
mand only the production of such records as are necessary and ma-
5 King v. Barnes, 113 N. Y. 476, 21 N. E. 182 (1889).
8 People v. Reid, 139 App. Div. 551, 124 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1st Dept. 1910).
7N. Y. JuDIcIARY LAW § 750 provides:
"A court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a
person guilty of either of the following acts, and no others:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during its
sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to
interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due to its authority.
2. Breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance, directly tending to
interrupt its proceedings.
3. Wilful disobedience to its lawful mandate.
4. Resistance wilfully offered to its lawful mandate.
5. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness; or,
after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
6. Publication of a false, or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings.
But a court cannot punish as a contempt, the publication of a true,
full and fair report of a trial, argument, decision, or other proceeding
therein."
8 People ex rel. Drake v. Andrews, 197 N. Y. 53, 90 N. E. 347 (1909).
9 "The power which courts possess of punishing for contempt, and for
refusal to give evidence is, in its nature, an exception to the provision of the
constitution. It is a power to deprive a man of his liberty without a jury and
without a regular trial. It cannot therefore be extended in the least degree
beyond the limits which have been imposed by statute." Rutherford v. Holmes,
5 Hun 317 (1875), aff'd, 66 N. Y. 368 (1876).
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terial to the investigation, otherwise it will be void.10 And there can
be no oral extension of the requirements of a subpoena for such oral
addition will not be a lawful mandate of the court," and will there-
fore be void. Disobedience of a void mandate clearly cannot be a
contempt.
L. D. B.
EQUITY--INUNCTION-ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFORM PLAN
OF DEVELOPMENT.-Plaintiffs were induced to purchase a lot and
dwelling from the defendants upon their oral representations, printed
circulars and newspaper advertisements, to the effect that the entire
tract being developed by the defendants was to be devoted to private
residences only. No mention of the restriction was made in the con-
tract or deed, nor was a map filed. Plaintiff now seeks to enjoin the
erection of an apartment house upon the tract. Held, injunction
granted. Defendants' representations were sufficient to establish a
uniform plan. Hofmann v. Hofmann, 172 Misc. 378, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 565 (1939).
Restrictive building covenants are recognized as valid and en-
forceable in equity.' These covenants are enforced even though oral,2
generally on the ground of estoppel. 3 Furthermore, such an oral
statement is binding on a subsequent purchaser with notice.4 To con-
stitute an estoppel it is not necessary that there be false representa-
tions or concealment of material facts. It is sufficient if the act is
voluntary and calculated to misle-ad and does mislead one who acts
thereon. 5 Such statements are as effectual as a deed from the party
estopped. 6 It has been held that where the purchaser takes in reli-
1070 C. J. (1935) p. 51, §38.
11 N. Y. GEN. CoNsTR. LAw § 28-a; People ex rel. Donelly v. Miller, 213
App. Div. 88, 209 N. Y. Supp. 717 (1st Dept. 1925).
' Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916);
Pound, Progress of the Law-Equity (1920) 33 HARV. L. Rnv. 813.2 Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862) ; Lewis v. Gollner,
129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891); Bimson v. Bultman, 3 App. Div. 198, 38
N. Y. Supp. 209 (2d Dept. 1896).
3 Philips v. West Rockaway Land Co., 226 N. Y. 507, 124 N. E. 87 (1919) ;
Nissen v. McCafferty, 202 App. Div. 198, 195 N. Y. Supp. 549 (2d Dept. 1922) ;
Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 375, 29 N. W. 135, 137 (1886) ("The change of
situation necessary to create the equitable estoppel, must, of course have been
made in reliance upon, and in pursuance of, the oral agreement, and so con-
nected with the performance of the contract, that, from the nature of the case,
the defendant should understand it was done in reliance upon his agreement") ;
Johnson v. Mt.-Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536
(1920).
4 Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891).
5 Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 118 N. Y. 634, 23 N. E. 1002 (1890).6 Nissen v. McCafferty, 202 App. Div. 528, 195 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1922)
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